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C) 
[Sac. No. 8438. In Bank. Feb. '1, 1957.) 
FRANCIS W. HUDSON et aI., Appellants, v. THOMAS 
WEST et aI., Respondents. 
{l] Water&-QuietiDg 'fit1~ppea1-Bight to ComplafD. of Error. 
-A judgment quieting title in defendants to all water flow-
ing through a ravine on their land as against plaintiBs' claim 
of a right to take a portion of such water prejudices no right 
of the state or its Department of Public Works, which are not 
parties to the action, and such department, in its amicus curiae 
brief on appeal, may not properly attack the judgment on the 
ground that defendants failed to eomply with the statutory 
procedures concerning the appropriation of water (Wat. Code, 
I§ 1200-1801), where the parties have not raised this issue. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, § 759(4); [2] Waters, 1714; 
[3] Quieting Title, §76; [4-10] Waters, §704; [11] Waters, §728; 
[12] Quieting Title, § 124; [13] Quieting Title, § 137; [14] Quiet-
ing Title, 187(2); [15] Waters, § 759(7); [16] Waters, 1740. 
J 
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--------------------------------------------------IS] IcL-Quieting !'itle - Plea4iDg - Oross-pleacllDg.--.:If a juag. "\ 
ment quieting title in defendants to all water flowing through 
a ravine on their land as against plaintitrs' claim of a right 
to take a portion of such water is otherwise proper, it is not 
en-oneous because of defendants' failure to cross-complain 
where they denied plaintiffs' right to take water, asserted 
their own water right, and prayed that their right be quieted 
against plainti1Is' claims. 
[S] Quieting Title-Plea.ding-Oross-compla.iDt.-When defendant 
in a quiet title suit denies plaintiff's title, asserts his own 
title and prays for aftirmative relief, defendant's title may 
properly be quieted though his pleading is not technically a 
cross-complaint. 
[4] Waters-Plea.ding-Riparia.n lUghts.-One who relies on a 
riparian right must plead the riparian character of his land, 
the quantity of water or the proportion of the stream to which 
he claims to be entitled as a riparian owner, and the location 
of his land with respect to the land of the other party; but 
while the quantity of his irrigable riparian land may also be 
alleged, this is more properly a matter for proof than pleading. 
[6] Id.-Plea.ding-Riparia.n lUghts.-A complaint by purported 
riparian owners sufficiently alleges the location of their land 
with respect to defendants' land where they claim to be 
owners of land downstream from defendants' land. 
[6] Id.. - Pleading -Riparian Rights.-Though a complaint by 
purported riparian owners claiming the right to take "four 
inches" of water flowing through a ravine on defendants' land 
alleges, without further qualification, an indefinite quantity of 
runm.ng water, in the absence of a special demurrer for UD-
certainty plaintiffs JJufticiently allege the quantity of water 
that they claim the right to use • 
. [7] Id..-Plea.ding-Riparia.n RightB.-The riparian character of 
land may be pleaded by alleging the existence of ultimate facts, 
which if proved would establish the land as riparian, or by 
alleging generally that the land is riparian to a stream or 
natural watercourse. 
[8] Id..-Pleading-Biparian Bights.-Although a general allega-
tion that the land in question is riparian to a stream or natural 
watercourse is conclusional, it is BUflicient to indicate to the 
other party the nature of the pleader's claim and is analogous 
to the commonly accepted general allegations of ownership and 
negligenoe. 
[8] See Oal.J'ur., Quieting Title, § 87; Am.J'ur .. Quieting Title and 
Determination of Adverse Claims, § 8L 
['1 See oaUur .. Waten, 1768. 
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[Ia, tb] Id.-PleadiD.g-mpa.ria.n lUghts.-One who attempts to 
plead the riparian character of his land by specific allegations 
must plead and show that some part of the land is contiguous 
to a stream or natural watercourse, that the land for which 
water is claimed is within the watershed of the stream, and 
that tlie land for which water is claimed is part of the smallest 
tract held under one title in the chain of title leading to the 
present owner. 
[10] Id.-Pleading-Riparian Rights.-AllegatioDB by purported 
riparian owners which allege that their land is traversed by a 
Datural watercourse, but whicll contain no allegation that any 
land for which water is claimed is within the watershed of 
the watercourse and fail to indicate that the land's riparian 
status has not been lost by severance, are insufticient to place 
in issue the riparian character of plaintiffs' land. 
[1l] Id.-Evidence-Riparian Ownership.-:Mere proof that plain-
tiffs are the owners of land through which a Datural water-
eourse runs, without proof that the land for which water is 
claimed is within the watershed and that such land is part of 
the smallest tract held under one title in the chain of title 
leading to the present owners, does not establish the riparian 
character of plaintifl's' land or entitle them to any water as 
riparian owners. . 
[12] Quieting 'l'itle-Judgment-OonclusivenCBB.-A simple judg-
ment in defendant's favor in a quiet title action, or a judg-
ment that plaintifl' take nothing by his action and that de-
fendant recover his costs, operates as an estoppel on plaintifl', 
determines title as between the parties and protects defendant 
against any claim of plaintifl' as fully as would an afIlrmative 
decree in his favor. 
[18] IeL-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Enor.-Insertion in a 
decree awarding defendants afIlrmative relief against plaintifl' 
in a quiet title suit, while erroneous because no request was 
made for such afIlrmative relief in the answer, did not prej-
udice plaintifl' in any substantial rights and may be regarded 
as surplusage. 
[14] Id.-Burden of Proof-'l'itle.-A party who would quiet his 
title must prevail, if at all, on the strength of his own title and 
not on the weakness of the claims of an adversary. 
[15] Waters--Quieting 'l'itle-Appeal-Harmless Enor.-Where 
plaintifl's failed to prove any right to take water from a ravine 
on defendants' land and by a judgment properly adjudging 
that they take nothing by their action they and their suc-
cessors were forever barred from again asserting against de-
(12] See Oal.Jur., Quieting Title, § 62; Am.Jur., Quieting Title 
and Determination of Adverse Claims, § 95. 
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fendant& or their nCC!easors e1aims to the water right 
was the nbject of the ution, plainWfa were not harmed b;y . 
judgment eon1lrmiDg defendants' right to take all water flow':; 
ing through their laud in the ravine during the ir~1gation­
BeaSon and eould not challenge the B111Ilcienc;y of the evi-
dence to npport ncb judgment. 
[18] Id.--Quletinc 'lttle-.J'udpumta.-A judgment quieting title 
-in defendants to all water flowing through a ravine on their 
land as against plainWfa' elaim of a right to take a portion 
of such water was too broad where the subject of the action 
waa to take water from sucb ravine during the irrigation 
season and the right to take water during the remainder of the 
;year waa not litigated, and the judgment should be modifled to 
limit defendants to the right to use all water flowing through 
their land in the ravine during the irrigation 8eason. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of El 
Dorado County. Ralph McGee, Judge.- Modified and af-
firmed. 
Action to establish a right to take water from a ravine dur-
ing irrigation season and to enjoin defendants' interference 
with that right. Judgment quieting title in defendants, modi-
fied and affirmed. 
Bradford, Cross, Dahl & Hefner and Loren S. Dahl for 
Appellants. 
Henry Holsinger, Gavin 1tL Craig and Hugh W. Ferrier as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants. 
Hughes, ){au! & Fogerty and Geoffrey A Hughes torRe-
IIpOndents. 
TRAYNOR, I.-By this action plaintiffs sought to confirm 
their right to take four inches of water from Grub Ravine 
during the irrigation season and to enjoin defendants' inter-
ference with that right. Defendants denied plaintiffs' right 
to take water, alleged their own prescriptive right to take 
all the water flowing through their land in Grub Ravine, and 
prayed that their own right be quieted against the claims of 
plaintiffs. The trial court entered judgment providing that 
plaintiffs take nothing by their action, that defendants are the 
owners of all waters flowing on or upon their land, and that 
-.Aaaipec1 b7 Chairmaa of .Judie1al 001Ulcil. 
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defendants' title to said water be quieted as against the claims 
of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appeal. 
It is contended on behalf of plaintiffs that they proved 
rights as riparian owners, that the evidence will not support 
a judgment that defendants have acquired a prescriptive 
right to take all the water flowing through defendants' land 
in Grub Ravine, and that in any event the judgment affirma-
tively quieting defendants' title is erroneous because defend-
ants did not cross-complain. It is contended on behalf of 
defendants that plaintiffs not only did not properly allege but 
failed to prove a riparian right, that having failed to prove 
their own right to take water, plaintiffs may not complain 
of a judgment confirming defendants' water right, and that 
in any event the evidence is sufficient to support a judgment 
that defendants acquired a prescriptive right to take all the 
water flowing through their land in Grub Ravine during the 
irrigation season. 
[1] On appeal, counsel for the state Department of Public 
Works, Division of Water Resources, filed an amicus curiae 
brief in which they attack the judgment, contending that there 
is no evidence in this case that defendants complied with the 
statutory procedures concerning the appropriation of water 
(Wat. Code, §§ 1200-1801) and that without such compliance 
no prescriptive right to use water may be acquired in this 
state. The parties have not raised this issue, however, and 
the judgment quieting title in defendants prejudices no right 
of the state of California, for neither it nor the Department of 
Public Works was a party to this action. (See Wat. Oode, 
§ 1052.) 
The Judgment is Not Erroneous Becam6 of Defendant.' 
F'ailure to Cross-Complain. 
[2] H the judgment is otherwise proper, it is not errone-
ous because of defendants' failure to cross-complain. Defend-
ants denied plaintiffs' right to take water, asserted their own 
water right, and prayed that their right be quieted against 
plaintiffs' claims. [3] In a suit to quiet title, when the 
defendant denies the plaintiff's title, asserts his own title, 
and prays for affirmative relief, the defendant's title may 
properly be quieted though his pleading is not technically a 
cross-complaint. (Talbot v. Gadia, 123 Cal.App.2d 712, 721 
[267 P.2d 436] ; Rinker v. McKinley, 65 Cal.App.2d 109, 111 
[149 P.2d 859].) 
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Even if Plaintiffs' Pleadings Contained Sufficient 
fo Place Riparian Rights in Issue, Plaintiffs 
Prove CJ Right to Take Water as Riparians. 
[4] One who relies upon a riparian right must plead: (1) 
the riparian character of his land, (2) the quantity of water' 
or the proportion of the stream to which he claims to be 
entitled as a riparian owner, and (3) the location of his land 
with respect to the land of the other party. (Riverside Water 
Co:v. Gage, 89 Oat 410, 420-421 [26 P. 889] ; Ban Luis Water 
Co. v. Estrada, 117 Oa1.168, 182-183 [48 P.1075] ; WutchumM , 
Water Co. v. Pogue, 151 Oal. 105, 112 [90 P. 362] ; Montecito 
Valley Water Co. v. Santa Barbara, 151 Oal. 377, 378 [90 
P.935].) It has been said that the pleader should also allege 
the quantity of his irrigable riparian land (Wutchumna 
Water Co. v. Pogue, supra; Montecito Valley Water Co. v. 
Santa Barbara, supra), but since that fact is important only 
as evidence of the amount of water to which the riparian owner 
is reasonably entitled, it is more properly a matter for proof 
than pleading. 
Plaintiffs alleged in their first amended complaint as 
amended by a pleading entitled "second amended complaint," 
that they are the owners of certain described land and of a 
water right "appurtenant" thereto; that they have been in 
possession thereof and paid taxes thereon for more than five 
years; that said water right of four inches has its source 
in Grub Ravine; that Grub Ravine is a natural watercourse; 
that the water flowing in Grub Ravine has its source on land 
above that of defendants and that said water flows from 
defendants' land, through intervening land, onto the land of 
plaintiffs j and that defendants' land is at an elevation higher 
than that of plaintiffs. 
[6] It is apparent that plaintiffs sufiiciently alleged the 
location of their land with respect to the land of defendants. 
They claim to be owners of land downstream from defendants' 
land. [6] It is also clear that plaintiffs claim the right to 
take "four inches" of water. Although without further 
qualification "four inches" is an indefinite quantity of run-
ning water, in the absence of a special demurrer for uncer-
tainty, plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the quantity of water 
that they claim the right to use. 
The remaining question is whether plaintiffs sufficiently 
alleged the riparian character of their land.. [7] The ripar-
ian character of land may be pleaded in either of two ways: 
(1) lay alleging the existence of ultimate facta, which if 
) 
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proved would establish the land as riparian or (2) by alleging 
generally that the land is riparian to a stream or natural 
watercourse. [8] Although the latter allegation is con-
clusional, it is sufficient to indicate to the other party the 
nature of the pleader's claim and is analogous to the commonly 
accepted general allegations of ownership and negligence. 
[9a] In Rancho Santa Margarita v. Va~1, 11 Cal.2d 501, 
528-529 [81 P.2d 533], it was held that three things must be 
proved to establish land as riparian in character: (1) some 
part of the land must be shown to be contiguous to a stream 
or natural watercourse; (2) the land for which water is 
claimed must be shown to be within the watershed of the 
stream (Bathgate v. Irvine, 126 Cal. 135, 143 [58 P. 442, 77 
Am.St.Rep. 158]); (3) the land for which water is claimed 
must be shown to be part of the smaUest tract held under one 
title in the chain of title leading to the present owner, that 
is that the land's riparian status has not been lost by sever-
ance (Boehmer v. Big Rock 1". Dist., 117 Cal. 19 [48 P. 
908]). It foUows that one who attempts to plead the riparian 
character of his land by specific allegations must plead the 
existence of the foregoing facts. [10] Plaintiffs allege that 
their land is traversed by a natural watercourse, but their 
pleadings contain no allegation that any land for which water 
is elaimed is within the watershed of the watercourse, nor is 
there any allegation touching the matter of severance. It is 
apparent, therefore,that plaintiffs' specific allegations are in-
81lfticient to place in issue the riparian character of their 
land. 
The question arises whether plaintiffs' allegation that 
they own land and a water right" appurtenant" thereto may 
be construed as a general allegation of the riparian character 
of plaintiffs' land. Such an allegation bas been held to be 
indicative of a right by prescription (Morgan v. Walker, 217 
Cal. 607, 608 [20 P.2d 660] ; see 26 Cal.Jur. 209, §414), but 
a riparian water right has also been described as • C appurten-
ant" in recent cases. (See City of Pasadena v. City of Al-
hambra, 33 Cal.2d 908, 925 [207 P.2d 17].) Even if an 
allegation of ownership of land contiguous to a natural water-
course and of a water right appurtenant to the land, liberally 
construed (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; see Matteson v. Wagoner, 
147 Cal. 739, 742 [82 P. 436]; Toney v. Security-First Nat. 
Bank, 108 Cal.App.2d 161, 167 [238 P.2d 645]), would be 
sufIlcient to place in issue the riparian character of the plead-
) 
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«'. land, plaintiffs did not prove a right to take w"hter •. 
riparians.if" 
[9b] Although the riparian character of land may be put 
in issue by a general allegation, to prove that land is riparian 
it is necessary, as previously noted, to show that: (1) some. 
part of the hmd is contiguous to a stream or natural water-
course; (2) the land for which water is claimed is within 
the watershed of the stream; and that (3) the land for which 
water is claimed is part of the smallest tract held under one 
title in the chain of title leading to the present owner. 
(Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, supra, 11 Cal.2d 501, 528-
529 and cases cited; see Kinney on Irrigation and Water 
Rights, 2d ed., vol. 1, pp. 794-795, § 466.) Plaintiffs proved 
that they are the owners of land through which a natural 
watercourse runs. They introduced no evidence, however, to 
show that any of their land for which water is claimed is 
within the watershed. Furthermore, although they traced 
their title back to a deed of 1890 by which the owner of. 
some 120 acres conveyed the 4-acre tract that they now own, 
plaintiffs offered no evidence of the state of the title to this 
tract prior to 1890. [11] Plaintiffs proved only one of the 
three facts it was incumbent upon them to prove, namely, that 
their land is contiguous to a natural watercourse. Proof of 
that fact alone does not establish the riparian character of 
plaintiffs' land, nor does it entitle plaintiffs to any water 
as riparian owners. (Rancho Santa Margarita v. VchZ,lI'Upra, 
11 Cal.2d at 528-529; Riverside Water 00. v. Gage, mpra, 89 
Cal. at 420-421; San Luis Water Co. v. Estrada, Ittpra, 117 
Cal. at 172-173, 182-183; WvtcAumna Wafer Co.v. Pogve, 
Ittpra, 151 Cal. at 111-112.) 
Having Failed fo Prove Their Own Righf fo Tale Wafer, 
·Plaintiffs May Not Complain of a Judgment Confirming 
Defendants' Water Right. 
[ta] In Warden v. Stoll, 210 Cal. 374, 877 [291 P. 835], 
it was held: "A. simple judgment in a quiet title action in 
favor of the defendant, that is that plaintiff take nothing by 
his said action and that defendant r~over his costs, operates 
as an estoppel upon the plaintiff and determines title as 
between the parties and protects the defendant against any 
claim of the plaintiff as fully as would an affirmative decree 
in his favor. [Citations.] [13] The insertion, therefore, in the 
decree in this action of a provision awarding the respondents 
affirmative relief against the appellant, while erroneous, does 
not prejudice the appellant in any of her substantial rights 
) 
) 
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and may be ftgarded 88 .urplusage." '.l'his rule is weD 
lettled. (CaU/omitJ.Baln.k \'. Traeger, 215 CaL 346, 349-351 
[10 P.2d 51]; AZZm \'. McGee, 54 Oal.App.2d 476, 485-486 
[129 P.2d 143] ; Wagner v. WoreU, 76 Oal.App.2d 172, 182-
183 [172 P.2d 751]; and see generally, White \'. Lantz, 126 
Cal.App. 693 [14 P.2d 1041] and authorities there cited.) 
Moreover, it derives additional support from section 581e of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that when a 
plaintiif fails to prove his ease and a judgment of nonsuit 
is entered· against him, the judgment is an adjudication upon 
the merits unless the court provides to the contrary. 
[14] It is fundamental that a party who would quiet 
his title must prevail, if at all, on the strength of his own 
title and not on the weakness of thf claims of an adversary. 
(HeWey \'. 8a[&, 38 Oa1.2d 21,23 [237 P.2d 269].) [lIS] The 
record in this ease discloses that plainti1fs failed to prove any 
right to take water from Grub Ravine, and it was therefore 
properly adjudged that they take nothing by their action. 
By that judgment plaintiffs and their successors are forever 
barred from again asserting against defendants or their suc-
cessors claims. made or which could have been made, to the 
water right that is the subject of this action. Plaintiifs are 
not harmed, therefore, by a judgment confirming defendants' 
right to take all the water flowing through their land in Grub 
Ravine during the irrigation season and may not challenge 
the sufliciency of the evidence to support such a judgment. 
(Allen \'. McGee, tupra.) 
[16] The judgment entered by the trial court, however, is 
too broad in providing that defendants are the owners of all 
waters arising on, or flowing on, or upon, their land. The 
ftCOrd discloses that the subject of this action was the right 
to take water from Grub Ravine during the irrigation season. 
The right to take water during the remainder of the 'year 
was Dot litigated. The judgment is modified, therefore, to 
limit defendants to the right to use all the water llowing 
through their land in Grub 'Ravine during the irrigation 
season. AI 80 modified the judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs 
aha11 bear the costs of this appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., concurrecL 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance and 
in the reasoning in the majority opinion with the exception 
of the inference which might be drawn therefrom that • 
) 
) 
,riparian right may be pleaded by simply aneging the V"',1&-:~,. 
ship of land situated on a natural stream or watercourse 
the ownership of a water right from said stream as being 
appurtenant to said land. It is my opinion that such a plead- • 
ing would not be sufficient to raise an issue of riparian owner-·'.· 
ship or the existence ofa riparian right. (See Jliverride Wafer, 
Co. v. Gage, 89 Cal. 410, 420 [26 P. 889]; Wufchumna Wafer 
Co. v. Pogue, 151 Cal. 105, 112 [90 P. 362] ; Sa", Luis Wafer .. 
Co. v. Estrada, 117 Cal. 168, 182 [48 P. 1075] ; Creighton v. 
EtJtJM, 53 Cal. 55; Montecito etc. Co. v. Sanfa Barbara, 151 . 
Cal. 877 [90 P. 935] ; Title I".,. etc. Co. v. Miller tf Ltu:,ltaC., , 
183 Cal. 71 [190 P. 433]; Strong v. BaZclwin,l54 Cal. 150 [97 .• 
P. 178, 129 Am.St.Rep. 149]; Rancho Banfa Margarita v. 
Vail, 11 Cal.2d 501, 528-529 [81 P.2d 533].) It appears to . 
be the settled law of this state that the riparian right, or 
the right of a riparian owner to have his portion of the water . 
1l0wing in the stream past his riparian land, is not an ease-
ment or an appurtenance, but a part and parcel of the land •. 
itself. (26 Cal.Jur., pp. 209-210, §§ 414,415; Ltu: v. Haggin, 
69 Cal. 255 [4 P. 919, 10 P. 674] ; Fe,.,.erJ v. K",ipe, 28 Cal. 340 
[87 Am.Dec. 128] ; Stanford v. FeU, 71 Cal. 249 [16 P. 900] ; 
Miller tf Lu v. Enterprise Canal If Lamcl Co., 169 Cal. 415 
[147 P. 567]; Anaheim Union Water Co. v. FuUer, 150 Cal. 
327 [88 P. 978, 11 L.R.A.N.S. 1062] ; Miller If Lu:x; v. Madera 
Canal etc. Co., 155 Cal. 59 [99 P. 502, 22 L.R.A.N.S. 891]; 
HenningMus v. Southern CaUl. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81 [252 
P. 607] ; FtiIJ, Biver Valley IN'. Dist. v. MI. Shasfa POfIJer 
Corp., 202 Cal. 56 [259 P. 444, 56 AL.R.264].) The rule as 
above stated has been restated in innumerable decisions of this 
court and the appellate courts of this state and the only case 
in which the riparian right has been referred to as being 
appurtenant to the land on which it is used is the recent case 
of City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 908 [207 
P.2d 17]. This case, however, did not involve the riparian 
right doctrine and no issue involving riparian rights was 
considered or decided in that case. It may be said, therefore, 
that the statement in the majority opinion in that case that 
"Generally speaking, an overlying right, analogous to that of 
a riparian owner in a surface stream, is the right of the owner 
of the land to take water from the ground underneath for use 
on his land within the basin or watershed; the right is based 
on ownership of the land and is appurtenant thereto," is mere 
dictum. It ia not supported by &n:3 of ~ eases cited ill the 
) 
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opinion in that case and I have found no other ease decided 
by either this court or any of the appellate courts of this state 
in which the riparian right has been referred to as being ap-
purtenant to the land on which it is used. On the other hand 
the authorities are uniform in holding that a water right 
acquired by prescription, appropriation, adverse user or parol 
license may properly be pleaded by alleging that such a right 
is appurtenant to the land on which it is used. (26 Cal.Jur., 
pp. 209·210, §§ 414, 415; Estate of Thomas, 147 Cal. 236 [81 
P. 539] ; Miller If Uux, Inc. v. J.G. James 00., 179 Cal. 689 
[178 P. 716]; Verdugo Canon Water Co. v. Verdugo, 152 
Cal. 655 [93 P. 1021] ; McDonald v. Bear River If Auburn W. 
If Min. 00., 13 Cal. 220; Rianda v. Watsonville Water etc. 
Co., 152 Cal. 523 [93 P. 79] ; American 00. v. Bradford, 27 
Cal. 360; Irrigated Valleys L. Co. v.Altman, 57 Cal.App. 413 
[207 P. 401].) 
In my opinion a litigant in a ease involving water rights 
is entitled to know whether his opponent is claiming the right 
to use water on his land as a riparian owner or is claiming 
that his right to the use of water is predicated upon pre-
scription, appropriation, adverse user, parol license or other 
sources of title. This knowledge can be gained only by an 
allegation in a pleading that the claimant is relying upon 
his right as a riparian owner. The elements of this right 
are properly set forth in the majority opinion, and I agree 
with the majority in its statement that a riparian right may 
be pleaded by either alleging all of the factors necessary to 
establish that right or by pleading the riparian character of 
his land in general terms; that is, by pleading ownership of 
specifically described land adjacent to a natural stream or 
watercourse and specific allegations that said land is riparian 
to said stream or watercourse and that the owner has the right 
to devote a specific quantity of water from said stream to a 
beneficial use on said land as a riparian owner. The elements 
which are necessary to support .·the allegation of riparian 
ownership may be established by proof as correctly set forth 
in the majority opinion. 
I would be disposed to hold, however, that although a ripar-
ian right was not properly pleaded, if the proof offered was 
sufficient to establish the elements of a riparian right and 
the case were tried on the theory that a riparian right was 
involved, a judgment based upon the riparian right 
theory should be sustained. Such, however, is not the 
.~ 
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.. tuation In this case. Bere, there is no allegation In an,. ,Of 
the pleadings and no itatement in the findings or judgment 
which would support the riparian right doctrine. Neither is 
there any evidence which in the slightest degree supports the 
elements necessary to establish riparian ownership in either 
of the parties hereto or the right of either of said parties 
to make a riparian use of water. In fact, the only mention 
of the riparian right doctrine was in a colloquy between court 
and counsel and it is clear that neither party to this action 
had any thought of basing his claim to a water right upon the 
doctrine of riparian rights. It is clear, therefore, that there 
is no issue pertaining to riparian rights in this action. 
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Schauer in this case 
is based upon the assumption that the riparian right issue 
is involved in this case and that the controversy between the 
parties involves the right to store and impound water. Both 
of these assumptions are erroneous. From what I have here-
tofore stated it is obvious that the riparian right issue is not ' 
involved in this case. With respect to the question of the 
right to store or impound water, plaintiff alleged in his second 
amended complaint: "V. That on or about October, 1949, the 
defendants West herein constructed, across the said ravine, a 
dam of earth in excess of about fifteen feet in height, and 
that said dam constructed on the lands of defendants has 
stopped the flow of water as it was wont to flow from and 
across the lands of defendants through the intervening lands 
onto the landS of plaintUfs; that the defendants West herein 
have taken, used and diverted all of the water flowing in said 
water course and that the plaintiffs herein have not been able 
to use any water from said ravine or watercourse by reason 
of the fact that the defendants West did construct said dam 
and did take, use and divert said water. 
"VI. That said dam constructed by the defendants is in 
direct contravention of the Water Code of ,the State of Cali-
fornia and particularly Section 6003 thereof; that said dam, 
as now constructed, constitutes a hazard, in that in the event 
said dam would burst or become destroyed by flood or other-
wise, the lands and the improvements thereon belonging to 
plaintiffs would be irreparably injured and damaged by 
flooding. " At the trial the undisputed evidence disclosed 
that in 1950 defendant constructed a dam on his property 
across Grub Gulch or Red Ranch Ravine. The dam was 15 
feet high, about 55 feet long on top and 30 feet on the bottom. 
The maximum depth of the water in the dam was about 8 
) 
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feet and it backed the water up about 60 feet. 'rhe maximum 
eapacity of the reservoir created by the dam was about 2 acre 
feet of water. The purpose of constructing the dam was to 
impound the very small flow of water in the ravine which 
defendant had previously diverted by means of a ditch, flume 
and pipe line to his land for the purpose of irrigating his 
orchard. This flow was determined by the only measurement 
made to be Ph miner's inches of water . .After defendant con· 
structed his dam, he pumped water out of the reservoir for 
the irrigation of his orchard instead of diverting it as he did 
previously by means of a ditch, flume and pipe line. 
Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has alleged or made 
any claim that the dam constructed by defendant was for the 
purpose of impounding water during the rainy season for use 
during the irrigation season and it is obvious that the reservoir 
behind the dam is not of sufficient capacity to store a suffi· 
cient quantity of water to irrigate any considerable area of 
land. We may take judicial notice that 2 acre feet of water 
would not be sufficient to irrigate even 2 acres of land during 
the irrigation season in the locality where defendant's land 
is situated. The record discloses that defendant owns approxi. 
mately 25 acres of land which is devoted to an orchard and 
that he found it more practical to impound the small flow 
of water flowing in the ravine above his reservoir so that he 
could more efticiently use it to irrigate his orchard. 
AB stated in the majority opinion defendant makes no claim 
to the use of any water from the ravine during the non· 
irrigation season and the evidence shows that the water in 
the ravine would flow through the spillway of the dam during 
the nonirrigation season and on down the ravine. In fact, 
the plainti1f complained t;hat the dam constituted a hazard to 
his property because it might fail and the increased flow of 
water from the reservoir would damage his property. The 
trial court found against this contention. 
The undisputed evidence showed that the irrigation season 
extended from May to October and that during the rest of 
the year there was so much water flowing down the ravine 
that it was a menace to plainti1f's property and one of the 
issues raised by his complaint was that the dam constructed 
by defendant in the ravine accentuated that menace and for 
this reason he wanted the dam abated. 
The trial court wrote a memorandum opinion in which he 
stated that plainti1f had not made out a case because he had 
not proven that he had used any given quantity of water 
c836 H'ODBON v. WE'f 
from the ravine, that prior to the iDsta1Iation of the 
syphon in the ditch of the El Dorado Irrigation JJilrtrict1i 
plaintiff had undoubtedly received IUflicient water for 
needs from the leaky wooden syphon and the spring on 
Clark property which was located between the property 
by plaintiff and defendant. 
The court made findings of fact to the effect that defendant 
had used all of the water which flowed from the Jones property . 
. continuously for mare than five years and that no water . 
flowed from defendant's property to plaintiff's property; that 
the dam was not a menace or hazard to plaintiff's nrllnAM:v 
and that defendant had not violated plaintiff's right 
ing the dam and impounding the water behind it. The CUUCL<'1 
quieted defendant's title to his land and all of the water 
flowing in the ravine above his dam and denied plaintiff any· 
relief. . 
I agree with the majority that the judgment should be 
modified by limiting defendant's use of all of the water Ilm1Vin1l 
in the ravine to the irrigation season, as it is conceded 
neither he nor plaintiff has any use for water for irrjigation 
during the nonirrigation season. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-The majority opinion avoids 
rather than ansWers the basic questions presented by this 
appeal, which questions have been the subject· of extended. 
study and debate among the justices of this court. I respect- . 
fully differ with them in at least three signi1lcant aspects 
of their action: (1) As to the tenability of the ground on· 
which they make present disposition of the appeal; (2) as to 
the wisdom and practicality of this court's undertaking (in-·. 
stead of reversing and remanding to the trial court) to itself 
revise and delimit the trial court's judgment purporting to . 
quiet title to "an waters .•• flowing on" defendants' prop-
erty; and (8) as to the implied determination that present 
avoidance of the real issues is the better administration of 
justice. (See Code eiv. Proc., § 53.) I am Dot sure to what 
enent, if any, I differ with the majority as to the law which 
should govern the important questions which have been de-
bated but are not decided because I do not know in IUflicient 
detan what the majority's holdings would be. This I do 
know; their opinion leaves unanswered the following questions 
which are important: 
1. Under the majority holding do the defendants have the 
absolute right to impound and store behind their dam aU 
) 
) 
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water or any waltr flowing in the Grub (sometimes called Red 
Ranch) Ravine during the nonirrigation season for use during 
the dry Beason 1 
2. If not, of what avail to defendants is the judgment, since 
their proof was that for more tha'rl five years before building 
the dam they already had been using on their land during 
the irrigation season all waters flowing in the ravine' 
3. If the majority intend to give defendants the right to 
impound and store all or any waters flowing in the ravine 
during the nonirrigation season for use during the dry season, 
where in the record, and what, is the evidence (necessarily 
showing five years' adverse user during the nonirrigatioll 
season) to support such award' 
4. If the majority intend that defendants shall have the 
right to impound and store above their dam Quring the non-
irrigation season a part btit not all of the waters then flowing 
in the ravine, what and where is the workable standard or 
measure which shall govern the defendants in their taking 
and plaintiffs in their demands' 
Since the majority have seen fit not to resolve or even 
discuss the above noted questions, a much more full statement 
of the issues which have been debated in this case, and of 
my views thereon, is indicated. 
This is a typical water rights controversy. Defendants 
(upper owners) became the original aggressors when they 
built a dam on their land and cut off the natural flow of 
water in the ravine leading to plaintiffs' .(lower owners) 
property. Plaintiffs as a defensive and retaliatory move then 
instituted the subject proceeding seeking injunctive relief and 
to have their title to a fixed amount of water quieted. De-
fendants answered and themselves sought and were awarded 
affirmative relief. Plaintifl's appeal from the judgment which 
purports not only to deny the relief they sought but also to 
quiet title in defendants to their described real property in 
the county of EI Dorado, together with •• all ditches, water 
ways and watercourses, of whatsoever kind or character sit-
uate upon said real property, and all waters arising on, or 
flowing on, or upon, the said real property." 
Ownership of the several parcels of land by the respective 
parties, as established by the findings of fact, is not in dispute. 
Hence it follows that (in respect to the water here in dispute) 
such respective parties are, prima facie, entitled to whatever 
presumptions of ownership of water the law attaches to the 
ownership of the land over which the water flows in the eir· 
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cumstances disclosed by the evidence. The judgment in de;~ 
fendants' favor as to the water is based on their claim of '.c 
prescriptive right thereto. Defendants' claim of title by pre-
scription is new matter on which they had the burden of 
proof. Plainti1is attack the judgment principally on the 
ground that the evidence fails to establish adverse user by 
defendants for the statutory period. 
It is to be emphasized that in considering the issues pre-
sented by plainti1is' appeal the problem is not whether plain-
tiffs established any right to the quiet title and injunctive· 
relief which they themselves sought, but, rather, whether the 
judgment decreeing affirmative relief in favor of defendants, 
by which their title to water in a much more inclusive scope 
than they had asserted before building the dam is declared 
and quieted against plainti1is, may stand, or should be re-
versed. 
As acknowledged in the majority opinion, "It is funda-
mental that a party who would quiet his title must prevail, 
if at all, on the strength of his own title and not on the 
weakness of the claims of an adversary." (See Helvey v. 8ax 
(1951), 38 Ca1.2d 21, 23 [237 P.2d 269] ; Peabody v. City of 
Vallejo (1935),2 CaUd 351, 381 [40 P.2d 486].) That rule 
is properly applied in the majority opinion as against plain-
tiffs here, and supports the determination that they take 
nothing on their complaint, but the opinion fails to make 
evenhanded application of the rule as against defendants 
when the latter assume the legally equivalent status (If plain-
tiffs in asserting their claim to quiet their alleged title. Just 
as fundamental as the strength [burden] of proof rule above 
stated is the rule that the character of a pleading is to be 
determined by its substance rather than by the designation 
appended to it. (Pickwick 8tages v. Board of Trustees (1922), 
189 Cal. 417, 419 {2] [208 P. 961] ; Terry Trading Corp. v. 
Barsky (1930),210 Cal. 428, 434 [8] [292·P. 474] ; Zarillo v. 
LeMesnager (1921), 51 Cal.App. 442, 444 [3] [196 P. 902) ; 
Keenan v. Dean (1955), 134 Cal.App.2d 189, 194 [5] [285 
P.2d 300].) 
Following the above stated rule, I agree with the majority 
that upon a aufficient showing of adverse use defendants' title 
to the water "may properly be quieted though his [their] , 
pleading is not technically [denominated] a cross-complaint." I 
.As stated in County of Los Angeles v. Hannon (1910), 159 
Oat 87, 48 (112 P. 878, Ann.Cas. 1912B 1065], when a de-
) 
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fendant in 'his "answer denies titlem plaintift and alleges 
that he is the owner in fee" of the disputed property, "In 
effect his answer is in the nature of a cross-complaint to quiet 
his alleged ownership of this property." Certainly, as the 
above quoted authorities make abundantly clear, defendants 
are not to be deprived of any proven right merely because 
they fai~ed to label the pleading of their aflirmative claim 
a "cross-complaint." But the defendants should not, as the 
majority do for them, give their pleading the character of a 
cross-complaint to attain its benefits but disavow that char-
acter to avoid its burdens. . 
A simple quiet title proceeding (which is the nature of the 
quiet title right asserted by defendants) is regarded as a suit 
in equity, and the issue of title is an equitable one. (See 
Thomson v. Thomson (1936),7 Cal.2d 671, 681 [1] [62 P.2d 
358, 117 A.L.R. 1].) Certainly if ordinary fairness is Un-
portant in equity, the quoted rule tluit a party must prevail, if 
at all, only on the strength of his own title, should be applied 
equally as against defendants here in respect to their cause 
of action for equitable relief on their "in effect ••• cross-
complaint to quiet [their] alleged" title by prescription to 
"all waters • • . flowing on, or upon" their land. Applying 
the subject rule, I cannot agree with the majority holding 
that "Having Failed to Prove Their Own Right to Take 
Water, Plaintiffs May Not Complain ofa Judgment Confirm-
ing Defendants' Water Right." Plaintiffs here may, and do, 
properly complain of that portion of the judgment (decreeing 
title by prescription in defendants to aU 1IJater. flowing in 
the ravine) which goes beyond determination of the issues 
tr&tJd8 by plaintiff.' complaint and 80 much of defendants' 
answer G8 relGtu fo tle/eGtmg plaintiff.' clGims. fJ'he judg-
ment as entered goes . far beyond the scope of the issues 
tendered by plaintiffs, and far beyond any possible support 
in the evidence. 
Looking deep in the reco;ait appears probable that the 
mischief in this case arises from the fact that the trial ~ourt 
apparently was persuaded, after submission of the cause and 
after it initially determined the decision it would make on the 
evidence and the law, to enlarge the scope and character of 
its intended judgment. The memorandum decision of the 
court states that "the plaintiffs should not recover and the 
defendants should recover their costs. The defendants wm 
prepare, serve and file proposed findings and form of judg-
) 
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ment in accordance herewith. ''1 Nowhere in that memor~~: 
dum decision does the court mention or suggest that judgment 
will be rendered for defendants quieting their title to the 
disputed and to undisputed water as against plaintiffs, but 
only that defendants should recover their costs. Moreover, 
the court's review of the evidence, in such memorandum deci-
sion, appears to be with a view to deciding whether plaintiffs 
are entitled to the relief they sought, rather than of deter-
mining defendants' affirmative cause of action. 
But legally the court had the power to change its mind, 
and presumptively did. The judgment finally entered quiets 
title in defendants to "all ditches, water ways and water 
courses, of whatsoever kind or character situate upon [de-
fendants '] said real property, and all toaters arising on, or 
flowing on, or upon, tke said real property," (italics added) 
and adjudges that plaintiffs have no right, title, estate or inter-
est therein. 
It is not in the denial of relief to plaintiffs, but in the 
affirmative judgment quieting title to "all waters," etc., in 
defendants, that the court on this record is shown to have 
erred. A scrutiny of that record reveals that, as urged by 
plaintiffs, the evidence is insufficient to support defendants' 
claim of a prescriptive right to the water based on asserted 
adverse user for the statutory five-year period. 
In conformity with the rule above stated, "that a party 
who would quiet his title must prevall, if at all, on the 
strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the 
claims of an adversary," the burden was on defendants, with 
respect to their claim for affirmative relief quieting their title 
to the disputed water, to prove their own title thereto. The 
evidence fails to support such affirmative relief in the herein-
after developed respects. 
The record shows that plaintiffs and defendants each own 
land near Smithflat, EI Dorado County. Defendants' land 
is at a higher elevation than that of plaintiffs. The ravine 
here involved was alleged by plaintiffs and found by the trial, 
I 
-atr-he-m-em-oran-d-u-m-deell-' -io-n-al-s-o-Bta-tes-th-at-"-Th-e-p-la-in-t-iff-.-ha-v-e -m-a-de \ 
80 measurements of water which fiowed from the lands of the defendant. 
before the dam was built. • • • It is possible to guess ••• that the dam 
reduced the fiow of the water, but there is no credible evidence in what 
quantity it reduced the fiow ••• To grant plaintiffs relief • • • would 
require a decree that the defendants release water in a stated quantity 
• • • Thil caDllot be done from the evidence • • • ueept by an arbitr&l7 
....-, ... " 
) 
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court to be a natural watercourse.· This finding is supported 
by abundant evidence,' which also shows that the ravine has 
its source in springs on land owned by one Jones, which is 
adjacent to and at a higher elevation than defendants' land. 
There is also evidence, although disputed, that such springs 
are likewise the source of natural water flowing in the ravine 
and through defendants' land down to plaintiffs' land.8 Such 
ravine or watercourse, as also found by the court,· lies be-
tween the lands of plaintiffs and defendants and extends in 
a general westerly direction from defendants' land, through 
the land of one Clarke, and thence to plaintiffs' land. As 
further found by the court, defendants, in October, 1950, 
built a dam within the ravine and upon their lands.· 
Under normally applied rules of construction the above 
epitomized findings should be accepted as establishing that 
8]'inding No. IT: "That Grub Ravine, Bometimes known as Red Raneh 
Ravine, is a natural water course lying between the real properties 
owned by the parties '" this action and extends in a general Westerly 
direction from the lands of the defendants to the lands of the plaintiffs." 
-Deacon .Tones testified that "the actual beginning of the ••• [ravine 
is] up Ilear the north side of our ranch," on which there are three 
springs "that lead into Red Ravine or this gulch or water course that we 
are talking about"; that "after and before the irrigatioll Beason ••• 
the waters of ••• these springs feed into this ravine ••• [but] during the 
irrigation Beason ••• I use it all." 
Plaintiff testified that the water in the ravine originates "about a 
mile above" his land and has "its Bource in natural springs"; that 
there was no "water that came onto" his place "from any BOUrce ••• 
that connects with this ravine ••. other than the thread of this ravine" 
and other than occasional leakage from the inigation ditch prior to 
replacement of the e;yphon in 1950. 
Mr. McKinsey, residing in the vicinity, testified that the ravine Is 
"a natural water course" which has its source in "an enlarged spring 
at the top of the hill, or almost to the top of the hill • • • GIl Deacon 
.TOiles' place"; that "the springs ••• 011 Deacoll .TOiles' property • • • 
is ••• the source of the water 1l0wing in the ••• {ravine], down to 
Mr. Hudson's [plaintiff 'B] property." 
Mrs. Williams, who resided on plaintiffs' property from 1944 to 1947, 
testified that during such period ahe and her husband got "plenty of 
water all the time [out of the ravine] for our horses and OUr milk eows" 
and for their garden, and iiI just supposed it was natural, because 
it ran all the time." 
Mr. Estey, a prior owner, during 1925·1926, of plaintiffs' property, 
testified that during such period he used water that "Come down that 
ravine. It is a natural run·off from that hill"; that the water 1l0wing 
in the ravine is from a "couple of big springs up there" on Deacon 
.Tones' land plus "very little" seepage water from such land; that 
there are no other eanyons carry water which runs into the ravine 
during the summertime (the inigation season). 
'Finding No. IT!: "That in the month of October, 1950, the defend-
ants coustructed within the said Grub Ravine, also known as Red Ra.neh 
Ravine, and UpOIl the lands of the defendants an earthen dam." 
) 
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both plaintiffs' and defendants' lands are riparian to the . 
watercourse. I As declared in Seneca Consolo Gold Mines Co. v. 
Great Western Power Co. (1930), 209 Cal. 206, 215 [287 P. 
93, 70 A.L.R. 210], "The riparian doctrine comes down to 
us from the common law and it has been repeatedly defined 
in this state; hence little time need be spent in recounting the 
holdings of the courts in this regard. A few citations will 
suffice. 
I 
,,' '. . . Every owner of land, through which a natural 
stream flows, has a usufruct in the water of the stream as it 
passes along, and has an equal right with those above and 
below him to the natural flow of the water in its accustomed 
channel, at its usual level, without unreasonable detention 
or substantial diminution in quantity or quality, and that 
none of the owners can make any use of it prejudicial to the 
rights of the other owners, unless he has acquired a right 
to do so by license, grant, or prescription.' [Citations.]" (See 
also Wright v. Best (1942),19 Ca1.2d 368, 382 [121 P.2d 702] ; 
Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail (1938), 11 Cal.2d 501, 528-
529 [81 P.2d 533]; Gin B. Chow v. City of Banta Barbara 
(1933), 217 Oal. 673, 684-690, 695-697, 706 [22 P.2d 5]; 
Weck v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. (1951), 104 
Ca1.App.2d 599, 609 [232 P.2d 293].) 
And in City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra (1949), 33 
Cal.2d 908, 925 [207 P.2d 17], the court declares, speaking 
through Mr. Chief Justice Gibson, that "Generally speaking, 
an overlying right, analogous to that of a riparian owner in a 
surface stream, is the right of the owner of the land to take 
-I agree with the majority (if such be the intended holding) that 
plaintiffs' pleadings are su1Iieient to place riparian rights in issue. To 
hold otherwise would be to impose far strieter rules on the construction 
of pleadings than is eurrently permitted under our code system. (See 
Code Civ. Proe., .452; Faul1cn.er v. California Toll Bridgt1 .duthoritg 
(1953), 40 Ca1.2d 817,328 [253 P.2d 659]; JlirA: v. YOGhm (1927), 100 
Cal. 681, 687 [254 P. 557].) 
It may be noted in this connection that plainti1l's allege in their 
second amended complaint that they ., are the owners of a certain water 
right, which said water right is appurtenant to the real property owned 
by plaintiffs herein, and the BOuree of said water right • • • is Grub 
Ravine, also known as Bed Baneh Ravine. That said ravine is a natural 
water course, and the waters therefrom fiow onto the lands of plaintiffs, 
across intervening lands, from the lands of defendants and have their 
souree on lands above the lands of defendants." And in their original 
complaint and first amended complaint (indicating tha.t the riparian 
nature of their claim has been an issue sinea the very inception of the 
action) they allege that their water right is "appurtenant to" and "an 
appurtena.nce to" their land. (See City of PGlaaena v. C", of .dZhambrG 
(1949),88 Oal.2cl 1108. 1125 [207 P.2d 17].) 
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water from the ground underneath for use on his land within 
the basin or watershed; the right is based on ownership of the 
land and" appurtenant thereto. [Citations.] The right of 
an appropriator depends upon an actual taking of water. 
[Citation.]" (Italics added.) (See also Peabody v. City of 
Vallejo (1935), supra, 2 Ca1.2d 351, 381-383.) 
Defendants' dam, as above mentioned, was constructed in 
1950. It impounded the water from the ravine. Plaintiffs 
commenced this action in 1951, contending that before con-
struction of the dam they had procured water for irrigation 
purposes from the ravine, but that since such construction the 
ravine has dried up and they have been deprived of such water. 
The trial court expressly found that for more than five years 
preceding commencement of the action defendants had "used 
all the waters arising on, or flowing on or upon . . . [defend-
ants' land] for beneficial purposes, to wit, for irrigating an 
orchard and pasture and for watering fowl and livestock 
. . .,". and as stated above, quieted title to all the water in 
defendants, with no reservation as to time or amount of taking. 
(Italics added.) . 
Plaintiffs-appellants (in the course of their argument) state 
that the "questions of law involved are: Whether or not 
an upper riparian owner who, for five years, has used a11 
of the water of a stream acquires a prescriptive right to the 
waters of said stream when the lower riparian owner has not 
made use of the water during the same period ,',., The stated 
question is neither answered nor even discussed in the ma-
jority opinion. In my view the resolution of such question 
is material to proper disposition of the appeal. 
Generally speaking, there are three ways in which rights to 
surface water have been acquired in California: 1. By acquir-
ing land through or over which a natural watercourse flows, 
which ordinarily and presumptively carries with it the so-
called riparian right (see eases, supra) analogous to the 
overlying water right (see City of Pasadena v. City of Alham-
bra (1949), supra, 33 Ca1.2d 908,925.) 
2. By appropriation. Prior to adoption of the Water 
Commission Act of 1913 (now Water Code) first right to 
~ding No. VII. 
'Petition for Hearing in the Supreme Court, page S. Alao, in the 
opening brief of Plainti1fs-Appellants. it is pointed out (pp. 11-12) that 
the springs which form the source of the water in the ravine ., are 
riparian to the ravine." and that "This ravine goes through the 
propert7 of plainti1fe." 
) 
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water, as between persons. neither of whom had other~i, 
higher rights therein, was declared under the principle of '; 
prior appropriation to be in the one who first appropriated it.: 
(i.e., diverted it to nonriparian land or for nonriparian uses) '. 
for beneficial purposes. (See 26 Cal.Jur. 32-51, and cases 
there cited.) Under the act the Legislature placed the regu-
lation of appropriation procedure in the hands of a water 
commission (now the Department of Water Resources, Wat. 
Code, § 22). In Wood v. Pendola (1934), 1 Cal.2d 435, 439 
[35 P.2d 526], it is stated that "The main purpose of the 
act is to regulate the right to appropriate and the issuance of 
permits for the appropriation of unappropriated waters of 
the state, through the administrative offices of a state water 
commission thereby created. The act defines what are or may 
become unappropriated waters subject to appropriation." (See 
also Temescal Wate,. Co. v. Depa,.tment of Public Works 
(1955),44 Ca1.2d 90, 95 [280 P.2d 1]; Bloss v. RaJu1,ly (1940), 
16 Ca1.2d 70, 75 [104 P.2d 1049].) And in Meridian, Ltd. v. 
San F,.ancisco (1939),13 Ca1.2d 424,450 [90 P.2d 537, 91 P.2d 
105], the court declared that the act gives to the commission 
"power to allow the appropriation for beneficial purposes of 
unappropriated water under such terms and conditions as in 
the judgment of the commission will best develop, conserve and 
utilize in the public interest the water sought to be appro-
priated. It should be the first concern of the court in any 
case pending before it and of the department in the exercise of 
its powers under the act to recognize 8lld protect the interests 
of those who have prior and paramount rights to the use of 
the waters of the stream. The highest use in accordance with 
the law is for domestic purposes, and the next highest use is 
for irrigation. When demands on the stream for those and 
other recognized lawful purposes by riparians and appro-
priators are fully met and an excess of water exists, it is for 
the state to say whether, in the conservation of this natural 
resource in the interest of the public, the diversion [made 
by another] is excessive." (See also Wat. Code, §§ 101-106, 
1052, 1201, 1225.) . 
3. By prescription. As against one with a prior or higher 
right to water, such as a riparian owner, an appropriator 
thereof can establish a prescriptive right to such water upon 
proof of the elements essential to the existence of such a 
right. Such elements include those customary in the case 
of other prescriptive claims: Actual, open and notorious user, 
hostile and adverse to the original owner's title, continuous 
) 
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and uninterrupted for the statutory period, and under a claim 
of title in the claimant, and not by virtue of tJnother right. 
The claimant must also show that his use of the amount of 
water he claims was for beneficial purposes. (See 25 Cal.Jur. 
1156-1165, and cases there cited.) Although the law is clear 
that rival appropriators who seek as against each other to 
establish rights based on claims to previously unappropriated 
waters must now follow the regulations and procedures laid 
down by the Water Code (§§ 1200-1801), no case yet decided 
has determined whether or not, subsequent to adoption of 
the act of 1913, and particularly of the 1917 amendments 
thereto, a later appropriator who has not shown compliance 
with the procedure thereby laid down can obtain a prescrip-
tive water right as against one whose rights are expressly 
recognized and saved by the statutory water law; i.e., riparian 
owners and "any appropriator of water to which he is law-
fully entitled." (See Wat. Code, §§ 101, 1201, 1202, 1450-
1456; Temescal WtJter 00. v. Department of Public Works 
(1955), supra, 44 Ca1.2d 90, 106; 42 Cal.L.Rev. 219-242, 
"Prescriptive Water Rights in California and the Necessity 
for a Valid Statutory Appropriation.") Inasmuch as the ma-
jority opinion affirms in part the judgment quieting title in 
defendants-a title claimed by defendants to have been ac-
quired solely by prescription through adverse use-it would 
seem that determination of the law on this question is material 
to the plaintiffs, and to the issues in this case. Furthermore, 
this issue of law is important generally to the people of 
California, and is not, in my concept of our duty in the 
premises, adequately disposed of in the majority opinion by 
the statement that" The parties have not raised this issue •.• 
and the judgment quieting title in defendants prejudices no 
right of the state of California." 
It is clear from plaintiffs' pleadings'· and from a colloquy 
between court and counsel during the course of the trial of 
this cause8 that plaintiffs were claiming a right to the water 
·See footnote 5, GAte, p. 842. 
-Such colloquy was as follows: "THE CoURT: Let me lee if 1 under· 
ltand your position here: There has got to be shown by the plainti.1r, 
b7 the greater weight of the evidence, the acquiring of a water right 
by grant. 
"Ma. MILHAll [CoUDsel for Plaintiffs): Color of title. 
"TlD: CoURT: To maintain that, Mr. Hughes, do 70U think the7 have 
to Ihow actual use constantly and continuously' . 
liMa. HUGHES [CoUDsel for Defendants]: Yes, Your Honor. 
"To CoURT: How about that, Mr. Milham' Do you agree' 
"lb. MlLIU.K: A water right must, under our water eocle, or eaD be 
) 
) 
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either 88 ripariui owners or under continuous user for a 
year period, or under both theories, and that the issue 
riparian rights was in any event inherently in controversy 88 • 
a necessary incident of determining whether either plaintiffs 
or defendants had established title to the claimed water by" 
adverse use. As stated hereinabove, the ownership of the 
lan,d here concerned is not in dispute. As also heretofore 
stated, the judgment in defendants' favor as to the water 
rests on their claim of a prescriptive right thereto, based 
on asserted adverse use thereof for the statutory five-year 
period prior to construction of their dam in 1950. And 88 ' 
further already noted, both plaintiff's and ~efendants' lands • 
are shown to be presumptively riparian to the watercourse . 
involved. Use of water in the proper exercise of riparian 
rights by an upper riparian owner (defendants) has long been 
understood to be not a use adverse to the rights of lower . 
riparian owners (plaintiffs), and it is only as to water diverted 
by the upper owner to so-called "improper" or nonriparian 
uses, BUCk as tke "orage of tDater during tke tDet ,eason to be 
wed during tke dry ,eason, that the use has been held to 
constitute an appropriation (rather than a riparian use) and 
so to be adverse. (See Moore v. CaZifornia Oregon Power 
Co. (1943), 22 Cal.2d 725, 730-738 [140 P.2d 798]; Seneca 
Consolo Gold Mine, Co. v. Great Western Power Co. (1930), 
supra, 209 Cal. 206, 214-219; CoZorado P. -Co. v. Pacific G. ct 
E. Co. (1933), 218 Cal. 559, 564-565 [19 P.2d 598,24 P.2d 
495] ; cf. Peabody v. City of Vallejo (1935), supra, 2 Cal.2d 
351, 374 [14]; Pabst v. Pinmand (1922), 190 Cal. 124, 128-
130 [211 P. 11] ; Miller ct Luz v. Enterprise CanaZ ct Land 
Co. (1915),169 Cal. 415, 443 [147 P. 567].) In City of Pasa-
dena v. City of AZhambra (1949), I1Ipra, 33 Cal.2d 908, 925-
926, this court declared that "The term 'appropriation' is 
said by some authorities to be properly used only with refer-
I 
lost, if the Court please, by non-use, but if it iii ripaM" and it ham't 
been deeded away from a ripaM" 01DtI1If' by graIlt, a ripaM" O1DtICIf' does 
Dot 108e by non-use. Now, that iii the law. [Italics added.] 
.. MIt. UVGlDS: There is no claim in this amended complaint or the 
complaint at all about riparian rights. 
"TlD CotJR'l': We wUl pass that point for the moment. 'l'he other one, 
other alternative, is to establish the right to it through the element of 
adverse p08session, if you can." 
It wUl be recalled that it is not plaintiffs' claim, but the aufticieney 
of defendants' proof of title by adverse user, that iii the critical point 
on this appeal. AI developed in the text of thc opinion, an upper riparian 
owner, if he is to establish a prescriptive right against a lower riparian 
owner, must ahow that hiI use of the water went bqond Jail own riparian 
rlahtl. 
) 
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enee to the taking of water from a surfaee· stream on public 
land for nonriparian purposes. [Citations.] The C~fornia 
courts, however, use the term to refer to any taking of water 
for other than riparian or overlying uses. [Citations.] Where 
a taking is wrongful, it may ripen into a prescriptive right. 
. • . As between overlying owners, the rights, like those of 
riparians, are correlative and are referred to 88 belonging to 
all in common; each may use only his reasonable share when 
water is insufficient to meet the needs of all. [Citations.]" 
In other words, a mere riparian use by an upper owner of 
any or all of the water in a stream does not constitute an 
appropriation of the water. 
The right of the lower riparian owner does not depend 
upon his own use or disuse of the right. As stated in 
Btanford v. Felt (1886), 71 Cal. 249 [16 P. 900], U [T]he 
right of the riparian proprietor to the :Bow of a stream is 
inseparably annexed to the soil and passes with it, not as an 
easement or appurtenance, but as part and parcel of it. 
Use does not create the right, and disuse cannot destroy or 
suspend it. The right of such proprietor extends to the 
natural and usual :Bow of all the water of the stream, unless 
when the quantity has been diminished as a consequence of the 
reasonable use or appropriation of it by other riparian owners 
for proper and legitimate purposes. (Ferrea v. Knipe, 28 
Cal. 340 [87 Am.Dec. 128]; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255 
[4 P. 919, 10 P. 674].) The use by the riparian owner of 
the water for domestic purposes for irrigation and for the 
propulsion of machinery is recognized 88 proper and legiti-
mate. This we regard as the law of this state. (See Ferree v. 
Kfl.ipe and Lull: v. Haggin, supra.) It appears to be law that 
where all the water of a stream is needed for domestic pur-
poses and for watering cattle, and is thus consumed by one 
proprietor, the law allows such use. 
·'But in making such reasonable use of water, such pro-
prietor must return the surplus which remains after such 
use to the natural channel of the stream. . .. " (See also 
Miller & Lull: v. Enterprise Canal & Land Co. (1915), supra, 
169 Cal. 415, 442; Herminghaus v. Southern CaUf. Edison Co. 
(1926),200 Cal. 81, 95 [252 P. 607]; Fall River Valley Irr. 
Did. v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp. (1927), 202 Cal. 56, 65 [259 
P. 444, 56 A.L.R. 264J; Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strath-
more I,.r. Dist. (1935),3 Cal.2d 489, 530-531 [45 P.2d 972J ; 
Meridian, Ltd. v. San Francisco (1939), supra, 13 Cal.2d 424, 
450; Moore v. California Oregon Power Co. (1943), supra, 22 
) 
) 
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Cal.2d 725; Prather v. Hoberg (1944),24 Ca1.2d 549, 562 1150: 
P.2d 405].) Further, "The use of water upon riparian lands 
is presumed to be riparian, and the burden of proving pre-' 
scriptive rights is upon the person asserting them. [Cita-
tions.]" (Morga" v. WalkBr (1933), 217 Cal. 607, 615 [20 
P.2d 660] ; cf. 8eneca Consolo Gold MiI:es Co. v. Great Weste"" 
Power Co. (1930), IUpra, 209 Cal. 206, 217-218.) "The pre-
sumption is that in the use of water an upper riparian pro-
prietor is exercising his riparian rights, and no title by 
prescription can be given, unless it is brought home to the 
lower riparian proprietors that the upper riparian proprietor 
asserts a right other than his riparian right. [Citations.]" 
(8cott v. Fruit GrotlJers 8upply Co. (1927), 202 Cal. 47, 52 
[258 P. 1095].) 
Here, there was neither proof nor finding that the upper . 
riparian owners (defendants) were, prior to construction of 
their dam in 1950, using all or any of the water flowing in 
the ravine for nonriparian purposes which would give rise 
to prescriptive rights or that (prior to such dam construction) 
it was ever brought home to plaintitfs, the lower riparian 
owners, that defendants were either exercising or asserting 
a right other than their presumptive riparian right. On the 
contrary there is evidence that prior to construction of the 
dam plaintitfs seeured from the ravine all the water they 
wanted or claimed therefrom. Further, although the trial 
court found that for more than five years preceding com-
mencement (in 1951) of this action defendants had "used all .'. 
the waters arising on, or flowing on or upon" their land, it . 
also specifically found,' in accordance with the evidence, that 
such use was "for beneficial purposes, to wit, for irrigating 
an orchard and pasture and for watering fowl and livestock," 
which use, on its face, appears to be altogether in harmony 
with, and not adTerseto, a lower owner's riparian rights. 
There was no showing or finding that the water was taken 
out of the watershed or was othel'}Vise diverted by defendants 
to nonriparian 1ISeS. It therefore follows that defendants' 
user is not shown to be adverse to plaintiffs as lower riparian 
owners until sueh time as defendants constructed their dam 
in 1950 and thus artificially impeded the flow to plaintiffs' 
lands of water in the ravine. And inasmuch as this action 
was commenced in 1951, the judgment based upon defendants' 
claim of adverse user for the statutory period of five years is 
~dinl No. vn. 
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patently untenable. To suggest, as do the majority, that 
plaintiffs are not prejudiced in the premises of the case, and 
•• may not complain" of the judgment, is unrealistic and 
untenable. 
However, regardless of what view we may take as to the 
preSumptive or proved character of the relationship of the 
water in Grub Ravine to the land over which it naturally 
flows (as being riparian or otherwise), the judgment here 
cannot be sustained. Such judgment as entered not only 
denies plaintiffs the additional prescriptive water rights they 
sued to establish but also deprives them of every vestige of 
riparian or other rights which apparently they had enjoyed 
undisputed until defendants erected their dam. Plaintiffs are 
left by the superior court judgment with no right to have 
any water at any time flow in Grub Ravine to their lands. 
That holding rests necessarily on a finding of prescriptive 
title to all the water in defendants. As hereinafter developed 
the majority recognize a deficiency in proof, which in my 
view requires reversal and remand, but which the majority 
dispose of by modifying the judgment. 
The majority hold that .' The judgment entered by the 
trial court . • . is too broad in providing that defendants are· 
the owners of all waters arising on, or flowing on, or upon, 
their land. The record discloses that the subject of this action 
was the right to take water from Grub Ravine during the 
irrigation season. The right to take water during the re-
mainder of the year was not litigated." This holding will 
probably come as something of a shock to the parties litigant. 
Certainly the trial court imposes no such limitation on the 
language it used, and reason Buggests that the tking most 
1I10rth litigating ",as the right to take and store the 1I1ater 
during the ftonirrigation season for later use during the dry 
season. And it appears rather likely that the parties have been 
under the impression that the dani was to remain in place 
and operative the year around: But, it seems, this is to be 
a new kind of water project: one in which water (if any) is 
to be impounded only during the dry season, and the surplus 
of the wet season is to run off unhampered. 
From studying the record it can be inferred that the ma-
jority conclude that the judgment is "too broad" for the 
.vidence to support because even the defendant husband did 
not claim that before the dam was built he used all the ",ater 
) 
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of the watercourse aU tA, !l6tlr.10 Be testified that he had 
. used all of it only during the irrigation season and admitted 
that during the remainder of the year the waters were per-
mitted to 110:w down to plaintiffs' propertyll I had thought 
it obvious that the main purpose of building the dam was to 
enable the defendants to impound during tA, nonirrigation 
.6tI80n water to be wed later during tA, dry .eason. 
It appears altogether clear to me what the defendants have 
attempted to do by constructing the dam. It is likewise 
altogether clear, under what I have thought to be a well 
established view of the law, that defendants have failed to 
prove a prescriptiflB right to all or even any of the waters 
they propose to impound and store. If the defendants during 
the irrigation seasons for five years or more wed all the water 
110wing onto their land in Grub Ravine during tAose .6tI8onB 
then it would not seem likely that there would be any surplus 
water to store up behind the dam during tAose .ame seasons 
in the future. Hence, the most rational purpose of the dam 
would seem to be to impound and store waters 110wing onto 
defendants' land during tAe nonimgation seasons. But de-
fendants do not claim to have impounded or stored Grub 
Ravine waters during the nonirrigation season at any time 
before the dam was constructed. How then do they establish 
prescriptive rights (dependent on proof of prior adverse 
user) to do that which admittedly they had never done be-
fore' As suggested at the very beginning of this dissent, 
do the defendants have a clear title to do that very thing, 
Or do they not' I do not find the answer in the majority 
opinion. But I do find in its loosely-defined limitation of the 
trial court's judgment a source of much future discontent 
and probable litigation. I think that this court should not 
undertake,as the majority do, to revise the judgment of the 
trial court by declaring that it "is modified ••• to limit de-
fendants to the right to tue all the water 110wing through their 
land in Grub Ravine during the irrigation season." (Italics 
a-nefendant husband testified as follows: •• Q. And ;you lrat became 
the OWDer of the property. as I remember. when' A. 1945 •••• Q. Now, 
during the period of time you have been there • • • how much of the 
water have you used' A. All there was. Q. After the irrigation season, 
is there any difference in the volume of the water' A. That is, in the 
ditch' Q. Yes. A. Yes; after the irrigation season is over, I don't Deed 
the water in the orchard. so I cut the ditch and let it go into the ravine." 
"Likewise. the trial court in ita memorandum of decision declares 
that "the testimony shows that the defendants used all of the natural 
-s»rine water Iv"", the i"...,,"twa '61J801&." (Italiea added.) 
) 
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added.) Do thl" findings of the trial court fail to support 
its judgmen.t' If they do support it, what finding is modified 
hy this court, and in what respect, to support its modification 
of the trial court's judgment! Have the majority made new 
or different findings to support their own judgment f What 
is "the irrigation season"! May defendants by staggering 
crops perhaps create several "irrigation" seasons! What 
meaning do the majority ascribe to the word "use" in the 
above quotlltion from their opinion f Is it equivalent, in their 
meaning, to .. impound and store" above the defendants' 
dam f If the proscription against "use" of all the water 
during the nonirrigation season does not prohibit accumula-
tion and storage during that season, does it mean that de-
fendants ·may accumulate and store all the waters during 
that period but must not water their stock (if any) from it 
or avail themselves of it for any other useful purpose' Is it 
to stagnate as a breeding pool for mosquitoes f If defendants 
may tue part of it, who has the superior right to how much' 
It appears to me that the difficulties these contesting parties 
are having will not be solved until it is at the least made 
clear to what extent and when, if at all, the defendants may 
impound or store water. This can better be done in the su-
perior court, and to make such determination it may well 
be that even the superior court would want to secure the 
assistance of the experts of the State of California Division 
of Water Resources. (Cf. Allen v. Oalifornia Water ct Tel. 
00. (1946), 29 Cal.2d 466, 488-490 [176 P.2d 8].) Certainly 
on the record before us it is not a task which this court is 
equipped to perform. We should not undertake to modify. 
in this type of litigation and in the major aspects here in-
volved, the obviously erroneous judgment which is before 
us; we should, rather, reverse it and remand the cause to the 
trial court for further proceedings.' And lastly, if the ma-
jority modification of the judgment means what it appears 
that a trial court could 'properly construe it to mean-that 
defendants may impoUnd water behind their dam only during 
the dry season-then the order that "Plaintiffs shall bear 
the costs of this appeal," is patently unreasonable, for they 
(if anyone) will be the real winners on appeal. That is, 
they will be, if they can afford and prevail in the further 
litigation which seems indicated unless the parties can agree 
on what their respective rights shall be. 
Shenk, J., and McOomb, J., concurred.. 
